When CSA Civil Violations Become Crimes: Court Clarifies 21 U.S.C. § 842’s Knowledge Requirement
November 22, 2026For companies and individuals regulated under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 842 is typically associated with civil penalties. But those provisions can also carry criminal consequences. A recent decision, United States v. Parkar, No. 1:25-cr-74, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257119 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2026), dismissing a misdemeanor charge provides an important reminder of that possibility, while drawing a meaningful distinction between the mental states required for civil and criminal liability.
Section 842 prohibits a range of conduct, including recordkeeping and reporting failures, dispensing or distributing controlled substances pursuant to invalid prescriptions, and—as relevant here—distributions of laboratory supplies in certain contexts. Its penalty structure generally starts with civil penalties. See 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(1). But under § 842(c)(2)(A), an information or indictment alleging that a violation was committed “knowingly,” coupled with a specific finding to that effect, generally authorizes up to one year’s imprisonment, a fine, or both. The statute includes exceptions, including a separate civil-only provision for businesses violating § 842(a)(11). In short, civil enforcement is not the only possibility for certain § 842(a) violations, particularly for individuals.
In this case, Parkar worked for a drug and chemical manufacturing company, which sold N-BOC-4-piperidone, a chemical used to manufacture fentanyl. During a DEA sting, an undercover agent suggested to company employees, including Parkar, that the chemical was being used to make fentanyl. Parkar nevertheless participated in an attempted sale of a large shipment. The parties agreed that he acted with reckless disregard for the buyer’s intended use, but did not know that the buyer intended an illegal use.
DOJ charged Parkar with knowingly attempting to violate § 842(a)(11), which prohibits distributing laboratory supplies with “reckless disregard” for their illegal use in manufacturing controlled substances or listed chemicals. The Government argued that the misdemeanor provision required only knowing distribution, leaving reckless disregard sufficient as to the illegal end use. Parkar argued that knowledge had to extend to that end use, too.
The court agreed with Parkar. “Knowingly”—in § 842(c)(2)(A)—modifies the entire “violation,” not simply distribution. Thus, for criminal liability, knowledge supplants the civil provision’s reckless-disregard standard in § 842(a)(11)’s underlying violation. The court also reasoned that the Government’s interpretation would make the civil violation and misdemeanor functionally identical, rendering the added knowledge requirement largely superfluous. Because the information did not allege knowledge of the intended illegal use, the court dismissed it.
For future misdemeanor cases brought under § 842, the important question will be what the defendant knew about each material element, not merely whether the underlying act was deliberate. If other courts follow Parkar’s analysis, prosecutors invoking § 842(c)(2)(A) will need to allege and prove that knowledge, even where the underlying civil provision permits a lesser mental state. For § 842(a)(11), reckless disregard of illegal end use will not suffice. Although Parkar decided only that subsection’s application, its reasoning gives defense counsel a basis to test other Section 842 misdemeanor charges. Civil violations should not automatically become crimes.