Small Innovators, Big Hurdles: How Company Size Affects De Novo Success
November 20, 2026At the MedTech conference in Boston in October, CDRH shared a finding that deserves more attention than the overall de novo grant rate: small businesses (defined as those that received a Small Business Determination from FDA, which, for reduced de novo application fees, includes companies with gross receipts or sales of no more than $100 million for the most recent tax year) had less success than their “large” counterparts. CDRH reported an overall granting rate of approximately 45–55% from year to year, but the aggregate rate obscures the company-size divide. The slide does not quantify that gap or explain its causes, so it cannot establish why smaller companies fare worse. It does, however, raise a central question: is the pathway equally navigable for small innovators and larger, better-resourced companies? Several of CDRH’s observations suggest where the practical imbalance may arise:
- Pre-submission preparation. CDRH reported that pre-submissions helped set expectations. That opportunity may be easier for a larger company to use effectively: dedicated regulatory staff, experienced advisers, and funding for additional work can help translate feedback into a focused study plan and a stronger submission. A small company may have access to the same process without having comparable resources to act on it.
- New clinical data. CDRH said FDA often requested new clinical data in deficiency letters for de novos. Such a request may be manageable for a company with a diversified portfolio and substantial reserves, but existential for a small business whose funding depends on a single product. The issue is not whether necessary evidence should be required. It is whether material evidence expectations can be identified early enough for a company to plan and finance the work, rather than discover during review that its development budget and timeline are no longer viable.
- IDEs. CDRH reported that de novos with IDEs tended to have more success. That association does not establish that an IDE caused a better outcome or explain the small-versus-large company gap, though it does imply that earlier engagement on clinical study design may help resolve evidentiary issues before a company commits its limited resources. This observation is particularly notable because the de novo pathway is intended for moderate-risk devices, whereas IDEs are required only for significant-risk devices. For many companies needing to move quickly, the ability to proceed with a clinical study without an IDE is advantageous.
Resources are not the whole story, however. CDRH said its concerns generally centered more on whether benefit had been established than on whether risk had been mitigated, and that it did not require overwhelming benefit relative to risk to grant a request. Its examples of non-granted de novos included minimal validation for significant clinical claims, unresolved safety risks, data-integrity or generalizability problems, algorithm overfitting, and well-designed studies that failed to demonstrate benefit. More complex examples involved small therapeutic effects confounded by study limitations, ambiguous adjunct diagnostic utility, and new risks observed in clinical testing. Those are substantive concerns, not merely procedural obstacles. They do, however, highlight the importance of alignment with CDRH via the pre-submission process on key submission areas prior to submitting a de novo.
While pre-submissions are intended to reduce the uncertainty during submission review, this is not always the case; new members of the review team often come with new questions and concerns, and the perspective of a prior review team does not seem to bind the new one. While it is better to learn during a pre-submission rather than a review that the team’s expectations are changing, this should be the exception rather than the rule and should be accompanied by a strong scientific or clinical reason for the change; it cannot simply be that the new review team is more risk-averse than the former team.
CDRH should examine the small-versus-large company gap directly, rather than leave industry to infer its causes. Publishing grant rates by company size, explaining how those categories are defined, and identifying the principal reasons requests are not granted would help distinguish evidentiary shortcomings from resource-sensitive obstacles. CDRH should also seek industry input on the practical consequences of additional data requests. A request that appears incremental to a reviewer may require a small company to raise new capital, repeat clinical work, or abandon development altogether.
The answer is not a lower evidentiary bar for small businesses. CDRH’s examples show why credible evidence of benefit and adequate attention to safety matter. The answer is a pathway with clear, proportionate, and sufficiently stable expectations that a small innovator can realistically plan to meet. CDRH’s own finding that small businesses fare worse should prompt scrutiny, not resignation. If success depends in part on the financial capacity to absorb late-stage evidence demands or shifting expectations, the pathway risks selecting for balance-sheet strength rather than device merit. CDRH should explain the gap and address its avoidable causes. A pathway for innovation should not become a test of which company can afford to stay in the review.